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In Personam Jurisdiction in Federal Courts




Since the United States Supreme Court's approval of "minimum con-
tacts" as a basis for state court jurisdiction over persons not present in a
forum state, general purpose long-arm statutes have become part of the
jurisprudence of almost every state. These statutes typically subject a
party who is not present in a state to suit there, so long as the cause of
action arises from certain contacts of the party in the state. An example
of this type of long-arm jurisdiction is an action in one state to recover
for personal injuries incurred within its borders, but resulting from the
use of a defective product manufactured by a company with no physical
presence in the forum. The distribution of the defective product in the
forum state would generally be a sufficient state "contact" on which to
assert personal jurisdiction over the distant manufacturer.'
There is, however, no general federal law akin to a state long-arm
statute which authorizes in personam jurisdiction in a federal district
court. Such a void restricts the court's authority over persons who cannot
be served with process within the geographic boundaries of the state in
which the district court sits. Although some statutes that establish federal
rights and remedies do authorize extraterritorial service of process in
cases arising under them,2 most do not. Thus, for many federal causes of
action in which extraterritorial service of process is needed it is necessary
to rely on Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 Rule 4(e)
permits a federal plaintiff to utilize the long-arm jurisdiction provided by
the law of the state in which the district court sits.'
An approach to long-arm jurisdiction which invests a federal court
with the same degree of long-arm jurisdiction as a state court has little to
command for itself. As it concerns alien corporations, current law on ex-
traterritorial in personam jurisdiction in federal courts creates a signifi-
cant loophole through which these corporations can avoid personal juris-
* B.S. 1967, University of Illinois; J.D. 1970, Northwestern University; LL.M. 1971,
University of London. Partner, Davis, Graham, & Stubbs; Lecturer, University of Denver
College of Law.
1. Cf. World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980).
2. See infra note 7.
3. Rule 4(e) permits extraterritorial service of process pursuant to federal law (where it
is authorized) and, alternatively, under applicable law of the forum state.
4. See infra at 62.
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diction in any federal court. This situation arises from the fact that Rule
4(e) looks to state law principles of extraterritorial personal jurisdiction,
which (in both a statutory and constitutional sense), depend upon the
alien corporation's activities or contacts with the forum state. If these
contacts are insufficient to satisfy state statutory or fourteenth amend-
ment due process criteria, the state long-arm statute cannot be invoked,
and long-arm jurisdiction in that forum is unavailable. Moreover, if the
alien corporation has no state contacts sufficient to permit the use of a
state long-arm statute, but there are sufficient contacts with the United
States as a whole to satisfy a fifth amendment due process test of juris-
diction, current law would permit such a defendant to escape federal ju-
risdiction under most circumstances.
With regard to a foreign corporation,5 current reliance on state long-
arm jurisdiction may be interfering with policies embodied in the general
and specific federal venue statutes of Title 28 of the U.S. Code. For exam-
ple, section 1391(b), allows federal question cases to be brought, inter
alia, in the district in which the claim arose. That district may not, how-
ever, be the one in which the defendant has sufficient contacts under
state law to support in personam jurisdiction. Since a federal court is con-
stitutionally permitted to exercise jurisdiction over any domestic corpora-
tion regardless of where located, Rule 4(e)'s dependence on state contacts
effectively increases locational requirements of federal venue law (e.g.,
contacts with the forum state). When so viewed, Rule 4(e) may be unin-
tentionally derrogating from policies expressed in federal venue statutes
and may be an unnecessary circumscription on a plaintiff's choice of fora.
The discussion which follows examines the current status of federal
long-arm jurisdiction, the practical problems associated with its use, and
the constitutional limits on federal in personamn jurisdiction. The conclu-
sion drawn is that a generally applicable federal standard for long-arm
jurisdiction presents the possibility of a more rational assertion of in per-
sonam jurisdiction by federal courts over distant parties - especially
alien corporations. Such a standard should be authorized either by stat-
ute or as an amendment to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
for use in federal question cases.
II. THE PROBLEM: THE USE OF STATE LONG-ARM STATUTES IN FEDERAL
QUESTION CASES CREATES A GAP BETWEEN A FEDERAL COURT'S ACTUAL
AND CONSTITUTIONAL REACH OVER DISTANT PARTIES
Several federal remedial statutes contain provisions for extraterrito-
rial service of process in cases arising under them. Section 12 of the Clay-
ton Antitrust Act, for example, provides:
Any suit, action or proceeding under the anti-trust law against a cor-
5. In this article, "foreign corporation" refers to a United States domestic corporation
not registered to do business in a particular state. An "alien corporation" is one incorpo-
rated in a foreign country.
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poration may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is
an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found or
transacts business, and all process in such cases may be served in the
district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.
(emphasis added.)6
Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is similar, authorizing
extraterritorial jurisdiction wherever a defendant is an inhabitant, trans-
acts business, or in any district in which an unlawful act has occurred.
7
Under the Clayton Act, the "transacts business" test of anti-trust
venue has permitted long-arm jurisdiction to be exercised over corporate
defendants with no physical presence in the forum state.6 Long-arm juris-
diction under the Securities Exchange Act has extended to defendants
with virtually no contacts with the forum state, when venue was based on
the occurrence of an unlawful act in that state.9
Many federally-created causes of action, however, contain no provi-
sions for extraterritorial service of process.10 In proceedings under such
statutes, in personam jurisdiction over a corporation which cannot be
physically served in the forum state depends upon state long-arm law,
6. Clayton Antitrust Act §12, 15 U.S.C. §22 (1982).
7. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §27, 15 U.S.C. §78aa (1982) provides in perti-
nent part:
Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this title or rules
and regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of such title or rules and
regulations, may be brought in any such district [wherein any act or transac-
tion constituting the violation occurred] or in the district wherein the defen-
dant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, and process in such
cases may be served in any other district of which the defendant is an inhabi-
tant or wherever the defendant may be found.
Other federal long-arm provisions are found in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 §4 & 5, 28 U.S.C. §1391(0, §1608 (1982) (service of a summons on a foreign state or
agency or instrumentality thereof may be made by mail wherever the party is located, if
other specified methods not available); federal interpleader, 28 U.S.C. §2361 (1982) (service
may be made in any district in which a party resides or is found) and the Miller Act §2, 40
U.S.C. §270b (1982) (where venue is proper,extraterritorial service of process is authorized
in suits by subcontractors on federal construction projects against sureties on payment
bonds).
8. See, e.g., B.J. Semel Associates, Inc. v. United Fireworks Mfg. Co., 355 F.2d 827
(D.C. Cir. 1965); Lippa's Inc. v. Lenox Inc., 305 F. Supp. 175 (D. Vt. 1969). For a review of
personal jurisdiction under Section 12 of the Clayton Act, see Hovenkamp, Personal Juris-
diction and Venue in Private Antitrust Actions in the Federal Courts: A Policy Analysis,
67 IOWA L. REV. 485 (1982); Note, Personal Jurisdiction Over Alien Corporations in Anti-
trust Actions: Toward a More Uniform Approach, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 330 (1980); Note,
Personal Jurisdiction Over Alien Corporate Parents and Affiliates in Antitrust Actions: A
Plea for Perspicuity, 5 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 149 (1977)
9. See, e.g., Nelson v. Quimby Island Reclamation Dist., 491 F. Supp. 1364, 1377-79
(N.D. Cal. 1980).
10. No federal long-arm jurisdiction is provided, for example, under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964; for federal trademark infringement (15 U.S.C. §1051 et seq.) in patent matters,
see Activox, Inc. v. Envirotech Corp. 532 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); and in admiralty
actions, see DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1276 (D.N.J. 1980), aff'd
654 F.2d 280 (3rd Cir. 1981).
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incorporated through Rule 4(e) of the federal rules, rather than upon any
federal statute. Rule 4(e) provides, in pertinent part, that:
. . .Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the dis-
trict court is held provides. . .for service of a summons... upon a
party not an inhabitant or found within the state,. . .service
may. . .be made under the circumstances and in the manner pre-
scribed in the [state] statute or rule."
Thus, in situations where no federal statute is available, Rule 4(e)
directs a federal plaintiff to the long-arm statute of the state in which the
district court sits. In such a case, the in personam jurisdictional question
depends upon an examination of the defendant's contacts with the forum
state, even when there is a federal claim. Such a "state contacts" test in
federal question litigation arises from the requirement in Rule 4(e) that
when a state long-arm statute is relied on for service of process, service
"is to be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by
the [state] statute. . . ." Most state statutes will explicitly require exami-
nation of contacts with that state. 2 Even for those states whose statutes
are not so explicit, the fourteenth amendment imposes the same "state
contacts" requirement; it permits them, as a matter of due process, to
''exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant only so long
as there exist 'minimum contacts' between the defendant and the forum
state.""
For statutory and/or constitutional reasons, when a district court re-
lies on Rule 4(e) and a state long-arm statute for in personam jurisdic-
tion, it will only examine contacts of the defendant with the state in
11. See supra note 4.
12. The District of Columbia statute is typical in this respect. It reads in pertinent
part:
A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person,
who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the per-
son's -
(1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia;
(2) contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia;
(3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in
the District of Columbia;
(4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission
outside the District of Columbia if he regularly does or solicits business, en-
gages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue
from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the District of
Columbia;
(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in the District of
Columbia; or
(6) contracting to insure or act as surety for or on any person, property, or risk,
contract, obligation, or agreement located, executed, or to be performed within
the District of Columbia...
13 D.C. CODE ANN. 423 (1981) (emphasis added).
13. World-wide Volkswagen , 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980).
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which the court sits. 1 4 However, if the in personam jurisdiction of a fed-
eral district, court at least when hearing a federal question, is not consti-
tutionally limited by the state-based territorial principles of the four-
teenth amendment due process, and if venue is properly laid in a
particular district, is it correct that the in personam jurisdiction of the
federal court should nevertheless be no greater than that of a state court?
Should not federal venue statutes (supplemented by use of forum non
conveniens principles) determine where a domestic corporation (or an
alien corporation doing business in the United States) must defend fed-
eral question litigation, rather than have state borders (which are only
arbitrary boundaries of federal judicial districts in federal question cases)
perform that function?' 5
III. IN A FEDERAL QUESTION CASE THE IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION OF A
FEDERAL COURT IS GREATER THAN THAT ALLOWED STATE COURTS UNDER
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS PRINCIPLES
Much of the Supreme Court's teaching on due process limitations on
in personam jurisdiction of courts has arisen in review of state court (or
federal court diversity) actions. The principal decisions in this area -
such as International Shoe v. Washington; Hanson v. Denkla and World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,'6 - are fourteenth amendment due
14. Virtually all courts which have considered this point have so held. See infra notes
22-31 and accompanying text.
15. In a diversity action, of course, the federal court is merely sitting as a state court,
and its use of a state long-arm statute, and its restriction to state contacts, follows directly
from the principles of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See, e.g., National
Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 331 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting):
"Neither the Federal Constitution nor any federal statute requires that a person who could
not constitutionally be compelled to submit himself to a state court's jurisdiction forfeits
that constitutional right because he is sued in a Federal District Court acting for a state
court solely by reason of the happenstance of diversity jurisdiction."
16. In International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), the question was whether certain con-
tacts of employees of a Delaware corporation in the State of Washington could subject it to
suit there for the collection of a state tax. The Court explicitly rejected the notion of "pres-
ence" as a basis for jurisdiction over a corporation, and described a qualitative test under
the fourteenth amendment to determine whether the corporation's activities in the state are
of such a quality and nature as to make the exercise of jurisdiction over it fair and
reasonable.
Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), concerned the jurisdiction of a Florida state
court over a Delaware trustee in an action by residuary legatees of the trust settlor. The
Court followed the fact-dependent approach articulated in International Shoe but, in this
instance, found the trustee's contacts with Florida insufficient, under the fourteenth amend-
ment to warrant jurisdiction in that state.
World-wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), was a products liability action brought in
an Oklahoma court by parties who had suffered injuries in an accident while driving through
Oklahoma, in a vehicle purchased in New York. The Court held that the fourteenth amend-
ment did not permit the New York automobile retailer that sold the car to the injured
plaintiff and its wholesaler to be sued in Oklahoma. The International Shoe approach,
which placed considerable weight on the convenience to a party of litigating in a distant
state as a fourteenth amendment factor, was refined somewhat, as the Court noted that
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process decisions. The requirements they impose as a matter of constitu-
tional law arise from the limits of state government in our federal
system. 7
Due process limits on the in personam jurisdiction of a federal court
arise, of course, from the fifth amendment. The Supreme Court has not
opined on whether International Shoe principles (i.e., minimum contacts,
fundamental fairness) would govern in determining the constitutional
reach of a federal court in a federal question case. However, it is clear
that the due process clause of the fifth amendment will not impose a
state contacts test of in personam jurisdiction. Indeed, as early as 1878
the Supreme Court held that,
nothing in the Constitution... forbids Congress to enact that, as to a
class of cases or a case of special character, a circuit court - any cir-
cuit court - in which the suit may be brought, shall, by process
served anywhere in the United States, have the power to bring before
it all the parties necessary to its decision. 8
Thus, any person (e.g., a domestic corporation) located anywhere in the
United States could, constitutionally, be subject to the jurisdiction of any
federal court.1 9 Indeed, such was the precise holding in a case where the
Federal Trade Commission sought to enforce an investigative subpoena
against a corporation in the Northern District of Texas. 20 The corporation
had neither an office nor any other presence within the state. The fifth
circuit, noting that the FTC had statutory authority for such an assertion
of personal jurisdiction, held that it did not violate due process. Accord-
ing to the court,
[b]ecause the district court's jurisdiction is always potentially, and, in
concepts of federalism impose limits on state court jurisdiction regardless of the conve-
nience to the defendant.a products liability action brought in an Oklahoma court by parties
who had suffered injuries there in an accident while driving a vehicle purchased in New
York. The Court held that the fourteenth amendment did not permit the New York auto-
mobile retailer that sold the car to the injured plaintiff and its wholesaler to be sued in
Oklahoma. The International Shoe approach, which placed considerable weight on the con-
venience to a party of litigating in a distant state as a fourteenth amendment factor, was
refined somewhat, as the Court noted that concepts of federalism impose limits on state
court jurisdiction regardless of the convenience to the defendant.
17. As the Supreme Court noted in World-wide Volkswagen, the due process clause
"acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits
imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system." 444 U.S. 286,
292 (1979).
18. United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 98 U.S. 569, 604 (1878).
19. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 682 (1935)
(jurisdiction over reorganization proceedings of a railway line extending over many districts
and states may be conferred upon a single district court); Cf. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v.
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946) (Rule 4(f), allowing service of process anywhere within a
state embracing two or more judicial districts, is in harmony with the Enabling Act); Rob-
ertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619 (1925) (limiting the Transportation Act of 1920's
grant of jurisdiction to the district court where the defendant resides).
20. F.T.C. v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1981).
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this case, actually co-extensive with the boundaries of the United
States, due process requires only that a defendant in a federal suit
have minimum contacts with the United States. . . .[The subject cor-
poration]. . ., as a resident United States corporation, necessarily has
sufficient contacts with the United States to satisfy the requirements
of due process.2
The true International Shoe analogy in the federal system, however,
is that of the alien corporation which has no presence in the United
States, yet has certain "contacts" with the United States; for example, a
foreign manufacturer whose products are distributed in the United States
by an independent company. In this instance, the constitutional due pro-
cess limits on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court
should not depend on a party's contacts with any particular state. Indeed,
numerous lower court decisions have held that the fifth amendment test
of due process in federal question cases is different from, but may be de-
rived by analogy to International Shoe's state-based minimum contacts
test. Since the sovereign in a federal question case is the United States,
these cases hold that appropriate contacts of the defendant with the
United States as a whole will satisfy fifth amendment due process.2 2
Moreover, current federal statutory law in several areas appears pre-
mised on the assumption that in personam jurisdiction in federal ques-
tion cases need not have any connection to state or judicial district con-
tacts. In the area of securities regulation, for example, the occurence in a
particular district of an act or transaction constituting a violation of the
securities laws is a basis for service of process anywhere the defendant
may be found. In personam jurisdiction over a particular defendant in
such cases is not related to the defendant's own contacts with the state in
which the district court sits.23
The jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade (formerly the
Customs Court) is also not based on any state contacts. In actions
brought by the United States against private parties to enforce import
revenue laws, service of process may be made anywhere in the United
States and abroad. 4 Although the full reach of this court's in personam
jurisdiction does not appear to have been judicially determined, it plainly
is not based on state contacts.
2 5
21. Id.
22. See e.g., SIPC v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1985); Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589
F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979); Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978); Alco Standard Corp.
v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
23. See, e.g., Warren v. Bokum Resources Corp., 433 F. Supp. 1360, 1364 (D.N.M.
1977): "Given the extraterritorial service of process provision of §27, it is evident that so
long as venue is properly laid in the forum district for claims brought under the 1934 Act, it
is not necessary that each defendant have personally engaged in acts or transactions within
the forum in order to sustain personal jurisdiction over him."
24. CT. INT'L TRADE R. 4(d)(7)(h).
25. Apart from its numerous statements that the process of a federal district court may
run anywhere in the United States, the Supreme Court has not determined the specific
1985
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IV. ALTHOUGH NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED, RULE 4(E)
NEVERTHELESS IMPOSES A STATE CONTACTS REQUIREMENT ON FEDERAL
COURT IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
While it appears that a state contacts test is not part of a fifth
amendment due process limitation on federal in personam jurisdiction,
most courts have viewed Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
as requiring such contacts in cases where a specific statute does not au-
thorize a different basis for long-arm jurisdiction.
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 26 an action under fed-
eral trademark law, is a prime example. In Wells Fargo, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals considered the question of personal jurisdiction over an
alien defendant who was being sued on a claim arising under federal law.
The court had to decide whether it "may appropriately consider not only
the alien defendant's contacts with the forum state, but also the aggre-
gate contacts of the alien with the United States as a whole."27 The dis-
trict court had found the defendant's state contacts inadequate to satisfy
fourteenth amendment due process.2" As noted above, federal trademark
law (unlike the antitrust and securities laws) contains no provisions for
the extraterritorial exercise of personal jurisdiction, and therefore the dis-
txict court had relied on a state long-arm statute.29
The Court of Appeals considered the argument that due process, in a
federal claim in a federal court, will be satisfied by an aggregation of
United States contacts. But, the court specifically rejected such an ap-
proach on statutory grounds: "[Niot only must the requirements of due
process be met before a court can properly assert in personam jurisdic-
tion, but the exercise of jurisdiction must also be affirmatively authorized
by the legislature.""0 Since the legislature (through the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure) had not authorized a national contacts basis for federal
jurisdiction, the court considered itself unable to use it.31
A similar result, which follows analogous reasoning, was reached in
the arena of admiralty law. Admiralty is another area in which there is no
federal statutory provision for long-arm jurisdiction. In DeJames v. Mag-
limits, if any, imposed by the Constitution on in personam jurisdiction of federal courts in
federal question cases. Several lower court decisions on the subject, applying International
Shoe type reasoning (i.e. minimum contacts with the United States as a whole), are cited
infra nn. 44 & 47. See also Stabilisierungsfond s fur Wein v. Kaiser, 647 F.2d 200, 204 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1237 (6th Cir. 1981); Honeywell
v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1143 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1975); and Abraham, Constitu-
tional Limitations Upon the Territorial Jurisdiction in Personam of Corporations and Due
Process, 8 VILL. L. REV. 520 (1963); Green, Federal Jurisdiction in Personam of Corpora-
tions and Due Process, 14 VAND. L. REV. 967 (1961).
26. 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977).




31. Id. at 418.
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nificence Carriers, Inc.,32 a foreign defendant's contacts with the forum
state were held to be inadequate to satisfy state statutory and fourteenth
amendment criteria. The court therefore considered whether a "national
contacts" basis for personal jurisdiction could be utilized. From constitu-
tional and policy perspectives, the court found such an approach
unobjectionable:
[T]he court believes that it is not unfair nor unreasonable as a matter
of due process to consider the nationwide contacts of an alien defen-
dant in determining whether jurisdiction exists. . . . This court also
believes that many good policy reasons exist for applying the national
contacts theory, particularly in those federal question cases involving
alien defendants. In addition to affording greater protection to the
rights of domestic plaintiffs, the national contacts approach would
promote greater uniformity of treatment in actions involving federal
rights since the jurisdiction of the federal court would not depend
upon the liberality or conservatism of the laws in the state in which
the court sits.33
As in Wells Fargo, however, the court was compelled to reject the
theory because of Rule 4(e)'s requirement that extraterritorial services of
process "is only possible in those situations where the in-state activities
of the defendant would be sufficient to invoke the long-arm statute had
the defendant been sued in state court".
34
In another decision, Edward J. Moriarity & Co. v. General Tire &
Rubber Co., 35 a district court went to some lengths to explain that, but for
Rule 4(e), a national aggregated contacts basis for extraterritorial juris-
diction would be available to a district court. The case was an antitrust
action in which the question presented was whether proper jurisdiction
could be asserted over a Greek company, with no office in the United
States but some contacts with the forum state. The court upheld jurisdic-
tion based on state contacts and the state long-arm statute, but only after
concluding that it was precluded from considering national contacts as a
measure of jurisdiction:
[Wie feel that the appropriate inquiry to be made in a federal court
where the suit is based on a federally created right is whether the
defendant has certain minimal contacts with the United States, so as
to satisfy due process requirements under the fifth amendment ...
Unfortunately, this course has not been left open to us by the federal
rules or statutes. That is, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has
provided statute or rule whereby substituted service may be made
upon an alien corporation having certain minimal contacts with the
United States. 6
32. 491 F. Supp. 1276 (D.N.J. 1980), aff'd 654 F.2d 280 (3rd Cir. 1981).
33. Id. at 1283.
34. Id.
35. 289 F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
36. Id. at 390. Other federal question cases similarly declining to adopt a national con-
1985
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Although the reasoning of these cases is sound and they appear to
admit of no other result, there are nevertheless several district court opin-
ions reaching directly contrary results (i.e. holding that aggregated
United States contacts may be used to support extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion, despite the absence of statutory authorization). An example, is Cry-
omedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd.,3 7 a patent action in which a British com-
pany resisted the in personam jurisdiction of the district court in
Connecticut. The company argued that it did not have sufficient contacts
with that state to satisfy due process. The British defendant conceded,
however, that its contacts with at least one other United States jurisdic-
tion were adequate to satisfy due process if it was sued in that other
forum.3
The district court did not consider the sufficiency of the British de-
fendant's contacts with Connecticut. Rather, it upheld jurisdiction based
upon a "national contacts" analysis. The court reasoned that since a fed-
eral court is not subject to fourteenth amendment limits on state court
jurisdiction, and since the British company had adequate contacts with
other jurisdictions in the United States, jurisdiction in Connecticut was
proper. The court did not address Rule 4(e) or any statutory basis for
long-arm jurisdiction, resting its decision essentially on its general conclu-
sion that extraterritorial jurisdiction under the circumstances of the case
would be constitutional. 9
Another district court decision upholding extraterritorial jurisdiction
based on a national contacts test is Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S.40 Holt
was an admiralty action in which a Norwegian corporation contended it
did not have sufficient contacts with the forum state to support jurisdic-
tion under the state long-arm statute. The court upheld its own jurisdic-
tion on the basis that "defendant's contacts with the United States, both
qualitatively and quantitatively, are constitutionally sufficient to enable
this court to render a binding judgment against it."4
Rule 4(e) did not enter into the court's analysis in Holt. Because the
litigation presented a claim under federal law, the court reasoned neither
the law of the state in which it sat (i.e., the state long-arm statute) nor
tacts test of jurisdiction because of the absence of authorization to do so are Activox, Inc. v.
Envirotech, 532 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. J. E. Ber-
nard & Co., 508 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Finance Co. of America v. Bank American
Corp., 493 F. Supp. 895 (D.Md. 1980); and Superior Coal Co. v. Ruhrkohle AG, 83 F.R.D.
414 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
37. 397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975).
38. Id. at 292.
39. Applying the criteria of "fairness" and "reasonability" used in International Shoe,
the court pointed out that, inasmuch as the British defendant had no place of business
anywhere in the United States, there could be little difference to it in convenience in de-
fending in one east coast jurisdiction (where it had requisite "contacts") versus another
(where it did not). Id. at 292.
40. 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973).
41. Id. at 358.
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the fourteenth amendment were applicable. Rather, according to the
court, the jurisdictional question was one under the fifth amendment,
which looks to a defendant's contacts with the United States as a whole.
The court did note that even if due process were satisfied, it might, nev-
ertheless, be restricted in the exercise of in personam jurisdiction through
a statute or rule of procedure. Having ignored Rule 4(e), the court found
no such restriction in this case.
Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G.,4 2 is another
decision basing extraterritorial jurisdiction, at least in part, on aggregated
national contacts. Despite its acknowledgment that a national contact
test "has not yet been generally accepted and there is no specific statu-
tory authority for it,"4 3 the court nevertheless relied on it. The court held
that where the defendant is an alien and where there is no other forum in
which to litigate a claim, the defendant's aggregated contacts with the
United States can support extraterritorial jurisdiction.44 Rule 4(e) was
not discussed.
4 5
None of the foregoing cases upholding extraterritorial jurisdiction
based on national contacts are consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. As noted above, Rule 4(e) authorizes service of process pursu-
ant to federal or state statute, "under the circumstances and in the man-
ner prescribed in the statute." To rely on a state long-arm statute for
extraterritorial service of process (as these cases do), but to ignore the
circumstances under which it may be invoked (i.e., the presence of appro-
priate minimum contacts with the state), is a plain misapplication of Rule
4(e).
A reading of these decisions reveals, instead, that the court in each
instance was presented with a situation in which the exercise of its in
personam jurisdiction was reasonable and constitutional, and made prac-
tical sense under the circumstances of the case. In several of the deci-
sions, the courts appear to have utilized a national standard in order to
prevent a situation where a foreign defendant would escape federal juris-
diction because of its limited contacts with any particular state. Under
42. 432 F. Supp. 659 (D.N.H. 1977).
43. Id. at 664.
44. The court addressed personal jurisdiction from both a national contacts and state
contacts perspective, and appears to have based jurisdiction on both. As to state contacts,
the court observed that if they were "the sole consideration, I would hold they were not
sufficient to ground jurisdiction." Id. at 663. However, the court concluded that "[biased on
the defendant's physical contacts with the State, their substantial contacts with the country
as a whole, and New Hampshire's interest in protecting its corporate citizens injured as a
result of torts such as those alleged here, I find that this court has jurisdiction." Id. at 668.
45. See also Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer, 560 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1983); and see
First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 299 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Tenn. 1962). In an-
other case, Engineered Sports Products v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722 (D. Utah
1973), the court also upheld jurisdiction based on national contacts, noting that the alien
defendant there might otherwise escape federal jurisdiction altogether, since its state con-
tacts might be too dispersed to support jurisdiction in any state.
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these circumstances, the courts ignored the requirement of a statutory
authorization for in personam jurisdiction, and relied instead on their
constitutional power to bring a particular defendant before them. On pol-
icy grounds the result may be correct, but on technical legal grounds it is
undoubtedly flawed.
V. A GENERAL FEDERAL LONG-ARM STATUTE WOULD CURE THE
ANOMALIES AND INCONSISTENCIES IN THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
It is difficult to identify a rationale for the inconsistent treatment of
long-arm jurisdiction in federal legislation. To be sure, the presence of
authorization for extraterritorial service of process in specific statutes is
understandable. For example, federal interpleader 46 is a procedure specif-
ically created to adjudicate in a single proceeding, the conflicting claims
of various persons. This procedure would have little practical value if it
could not reach all interested parties, regardless of their contacts with a
particular forum. Moreover, the nationwide jurisdiction of the Court of
International Trade is explainable because there is only one such court in
the United States.
47
On the other hand, it is difficult to explain why federal long-arm ju-
risdiction is available for antitrust and securities law actions, but not for
admiralty, patent, trademark, and civil rights actions. And even among
statutes with long-arm authorization, there are differences which are diffi-
cult to explain. Under the Clayton Act, for example, long-arm jurisdiction
is available if venue is proper, with venue based on contacts with the fo-
rum state (i.e., presence or doing business). 48 The securities law also col-
lapses personal jurisdiction into venue and allows venue to be had in any
district in which an unlawful event occurred. Long-arm jurisdiction over
any defendant, regardless of its contacts with the district is then available
if venue is proper.
4 9
It is likely that the differing statutory treatment of long-arm jurisdic-
46. See supra note 7.
47. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
48. 15 U.S.C. §22 (1982); see e.g., Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 175 F. Supp. 793 (S.D.N.Y.
1959). This limitation on in personam jurisdiction in antitrust actions is criticized, and a
statutory national contacts test urged, in 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND
AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 5.06, 5.16 (2d ed. 1980).
A distinctly minority view is that extraterritorial in personam jurisdiction under the
antitrust laws may be exercised without regard to forum state contacts. See General Electric
Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 550 F. Supp. 1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
49. Rule 4(e)'s reliance on state long-arm statutes, when no federal statute is available,
creates its own differences of in personam jurisdiction from judicial district to judicial dis-
trict, since there are differences (albeit not great ones) among the long-arm statutes of vari-
ous states.
This, however, is not the only example of differing treatment of federal question cases
depending on the district in which suit is brought. Another is where federal law provides no
limitation period on bringing a federal claim, in which case state law provides no limitation
period. See, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1945).
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tion under various federal laws occurred unintentionally, rather than as
the result of deliberate legislative choice to authorize extraterritorial ju-
risdiction in one context and not the other, or to expand its scope in one
instance and contract it in another. The legislative history of the long-
arm sections of the anti-trust laws, for example, does not reveal any par-
ticular rationale or theory on which those sections were based, other than
to maximize personal jurisdiction. 50
With regard to Rule 4(e), nothing in it or its history reveals a specific
reason why long-arm jurisdiction in federal question cases is limited to
situations in which there is specific statutory authorization, or a state
long-arm statute. As originally adopted in 1937, Rule 4(e) read:
Whenever a statute of the United States or an order of court provides
for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of sum-
mons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state,
service shall be made under the circumstances and in the manner pre-
scribed by the statute, rule, or order.
The provision is essentially the first sentence of the current rule, author-
izing extraterritorial service pursuant to a federal statute. The Advisory
Committee Note to this subpart merely states that various federal long-
arm statutes available in specific causes of action "are continued by this
rule."6'
Rule 4(e) was amended only once, in 1963, when what currently ap-
pears as its second sentence was added, permitting service of process pur-
suant to a state long-arm statute. It is clear from the Advisory Committee
Note accompanying the new subparagraph that the amendment was in-
tended to accommodate the development of the new principles of state
extraterritorial jurisdiction following the landmark 1945 International
Shoe decision:
The second sentence, added by amendment, expressly allows resort in
original Federal actions to the procedures provided by State law for
effecting service on nonresident parties (as well as on domiciliaries not
found within the State). . . . The necessity of satisfying subject-mat-
ter jurisdictional requirements and requirements of venue will limit
the practical utilization of these methods of effecting service. Within
those limits, however, there appears to be no reason for denying plain-
tiffs means of commencing actions in Federal courts which are gener-
ally available in the State courts. [Citations omitted] .... If the cir-
cumstances of a particular case satisfy the applicable Federal law
(first sentence of Rule 4(e), as amended) and the applicable State law
(second sentence), the party seeking to make the service may proceed
50. The only discussion of long-arm jurisdiction in the legislative history of the Clayton
Act is in S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1914), where it is merely noted that the
provision "require[s] no special explanation here."
51. J. MOORE & J. LuCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 4.C1[2] (2d ed. 1984)(advisory
note at 4-19).
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under the Federal or the State law, at his option."2
Why the Supreme Court did not go further in the 1963 amendment
to Rule 4(e) and allow federal in personam jurisdiction to the fullest ex-
tent permitted by the Constitution, is not explained. However, it does not
appear that the Advisory Committee ever considered such action.
53
The absence of a general authorization for long-arm jurisdiction,
whether by statute or rule, not only creates anomalies, such as alien de-
fendants with U.S. contacts not being amendable to suit, but may actu-
ally frustrate Congressional intent as expressed in several venue statutes.
Probably the most prominent example is the alien venue statute,5 4 per-
mitting an alien to be sued in any district. With such a provision, Con-
gress has apparently determined that the relative convenience of a defen-
dant is of no relevance if that party is an alien. Yet, when suit is brought
under federal legislation in which a state long-arm statute must be used,
a plaintiff must nevertheless search for a district court in a state in which
the alien defendant has the "minimum contacts" necessary to satisfy the
state long-arm statute. Thus, the freedom which Congress gave in section
1391(d) regarding choice of forum, Rule 4(e) takes away by imposing
state contacts as an additional requirement for in personam jurisdiction.
55
A fifth amendment "U.S. contacts" test of jurisdiction makes excellent
sense in such a situation.
Even the general venue provision for federal question actions - au-
thorizing suit in any district where all defendants reside or in which the
claim arose,s s may be undermined by a state contacts requirement. "State
contacts" means that federal question litigation against multiple defen-
dants residing in different districts, could occur in a single forum only if
the plaintiff were fortunate enough to be suing defendants who had the
necessary "minimum contacts" with that jurisdiction. If, for example, the
claim arose in the Southern District of New York, and one of the defen-
dants was a California corporation with no contacts in New York, but
52. Id. at 4-32. Prior to International Shoe, the extraterritorial jurisdiction of state
courts was still constrained by the territorial concepts of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
(1877). Thus, even in the case of pre-International Shoe non-resident motorist statutes,
which conferred in personam jurisdiction over out-of-state motorists involved in automobile
accidents in the state, the perceived need for in-state service was satisfied by the fiction of a
state official (e.g. a commissioner of motor vehicle licensing) being deemed the out-of-state
motorists' in-state agent for service of process. See. e.g., Hess v. Pawlowski, 274 U.S. 352
(1927).
53. The American Law Institute, in its 1969 Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Be-
tween State and Federal Courts, published a proposed new Title 28 of the U.S. Code in
which, in §1314(d), nationwide service of process would be available in all federal question
cases.
54. 28 U.S.C. §1391(d) (1982).
55. The requirement is also artificial as one to secure in personam jurisdiction because
such jurisdiction, in a federal question case in a federal court, need not be based on state
contacts to satisfy due process.
56. 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) (1982).
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with a branch office across the Hudson River in New Jersey, an action
against all defendants could not be brought in the Southern District of
New York.
Requiring the federal court in New York to depend on minimum con-
tacts with that state in such a situation makes little sense. Constitution-
ally, the process of the New York court could extend to the California
corporation, and the presence of its branch office in New Jersey assures




In an era of high-speed travel and instantaneous communications, re-
liance on state borders to determine the in personam jurisdiction of fed-
eral courts in federal question cases is an anachronism. The extension of
federal in personam jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the
Constitution would facilitate the closing of a loophole alien corporations
have used to escape federal jurisdiction, and would also economize federal
litigation against multiple domestic parties by providing a single forum
for adjudication of most claims.5s It would also avoid the time and effort
spent in litigating 12(b) motions based on lack of personal jurisdiction,
when the issue is limited to the technicality of whether a large foreign
corporation with extensive U.S. contacts has sufficient contacts with the
forum state. Cases of legitimate inconvenience to litagants arising from
such expanded jurisdiction could be resolved through careful application
of the forum non conveniens doctrine.
Although a few courts have attempted to fashion such a federal long-
arm jurisdiction on a common law basis, it appears that it is up to Con-
gress or the Supreme Court (through an amendment to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure) properly to achieve such a result.
57. Any burden or inconvenience that would occur if a "state contacts" test were aban-
doned-for example, if the branch office of the California corporation discussed in the text
were located in Baltimore rather than Newark-could be addressed in a forum non con-
veniens motion.
58. From a policy perspective, there is little difference between federal venue statutes
and modern principles of personal jurisdiction, since both direct litigation to a forum having
some substantial relationship to either the claim or the defendants. Cf., 4 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §1063 (1969).
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